End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival Is

End of an Era: How China's Authoritarian Revival Is Undermining Its Rise This is a clear eyed, hard look at the recent policies of the Chinese Party State, and the problems which it will encounter in the near to mid future Where it truly excels is in offering a sympathetic exposition of these problems This is not to say that Minzner doesn t take Chinese leadership to task he does, discussing is detail many ominous possibilities that lie ahead but that he makes real effort to understand the problems in a way which would be recognized as true to the Chinese situati This is a clear eyed, hard look at the recent policies of the Chinese Party State, and the problems which it will encounter in the near to mid future Where it truly excels is in offering a sympathetic exposition of these problems This is not to say that Minzner doesn t take Chinese leadership to task he does, discussing is detail many ominous possibilities that lie ahead but that he makes real effort to understand the problems in a way which would be recognized as true to the Chinese situation Given the differences in ideology which often cloud anglophone works on China, and therefore anglophone understanding of Chinese governance, this is an accomplishment A good review of the issues China faces now and will face in the future that continue to drive its domestic and international agenda. 320.951 MINeAudioSummary China really is a modernized, updated version of traditional authoritarian bureaucratic imperial system It requires agency a regular back and forht between ruled and ruler alike through organized channles of government whether democratic or otherwise that build popular faith in them as channels to resolve grievance and manage social tensions The reform ere was China s golden opportunity to slowly construct such institutions But political reform grind down sin 320.951 MINeAudioSummary China really is a modernized, updated version of traditional authoritarian bureaucratic imperial system It requires agency a regular back and forht between ruled and ruler alike through organized channles of government whether democratic or otherwise that build popular faith in them as channels to resolve grievance and manage social tensions The reform ere was China s golden opportunity to slowly construct such institutions But political reform grind down since the early 2000s Since Xi s rise, tacit political norms collective leadership, avoidance of a cult of personality, immunity for China s top Party elite from criminal prosecution have begun to buckle or give away then come 2018, Xi abolish the two term limit on the presidency, China into controlocracy nativism , personalized Authoritarianism, anti foreign nationalistprinciple agent problem populist nationalism As Donald TrumpAuthoritarianism the political power is condensed into one authority figure, who has unchecked power Totalitarianism person in power seeks to control every aspect of public and private life.The New Democracy Party of China 1998 Founder Falun Gong 1999 New Citizen Movement 2013 successor to the Open Constitution Initiative OCI.OCI was established in 2003 by Xu Zhiyong , Teng Biao, Yu Jiang, and Zhang Xingshui from the Peking University Law School.Liu Xiaobo , 28 12 1955 13 7 2017 , During his fourth prison term, Liu was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize for his long and non violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China.Liao Yiwu also known as Lao Wei, 16 6 1958 in Sichuan Zhou Xiaoping 1 Fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912 ends two millennia of autocratic imperial rule 1913 1934 Frank Goodnow served a legal adviser to President Yuan Shikai assisted in drafting the first constitution for the new Chinese republic, failed when Yuan becomesdictatorial, and 1915 abortive effort to proclaim himself emperor 2 In the 1980s, China s leaders embraced legal reforms as a key part of their efforts to transition away from the political chaos of the Maoist ear toward ainstitutionalized model of governance Now, these doors are being shut Law is becoming less and less relevant to China s future.3 Tentative efforts during 1950s to build stable Party and state mechanisms of government to run newly established PRC collapsed in the face of MaoZedong s distrust of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power, his fear of political rivals, and his preference for ruling through populist street movement and black box political machinations This book aims1 Explain what is taking place in China Xi Jinping isrepressive than his immediate predecessors Maoist ear 1949 1976 elite political instability, stagnant economic growth, radical ideological fever the Great Leap Forward 1958 1960 lead to mass famine the Culture Revolution 1966 1976 lead to severe political turmoil Reform ear 1978 to early 2000s, three decades of the reform era relatively stable andinstitutionalized Party rue, supercharged economic growth and an openness to the outside world is over because of unyielding commitment to one Party rule.2 Explain the complex interplay between state and society in China during the reform era.3 attempt to think through various possibilities in the future chapter one Overview Then end of China s Reform eradecade since 2005 as one of democratic recession, authoritarian resurgence Birth of Reformp18 China in 197os, the poorest country Decades of political radicalism under Mao ZeDong had left China in disarray Mao s preference for ruling as supreme leader the great helmsman through mass movements destabilized state and society alike During the chaos of the Culture Revolution 1966 1976 , bureaucratic and legal institutions collapsed entirely Ideologically, China closed itself off Western capitalist and Soviet revisionist practices were decried religion and tradition ruthlessly suppressed in the name of socialist modernization Universities shut their door Intellectuals were packed off to do hard labor in remote rural areas Nor was the political elite above the fray Individual leaders and their families regularly rose and fell with the shifting winds of court politics Serving as Maso s heir apparent was positively hazardous to one s health The first two ended up dead, while his wife, who had tried to usurp power in his waning years, was arrested after Mao s own death in 1976 p19Deng Xiaoping s rise to power in 1978 marked a dramatic shift Orderly retirement procedures were adopted to clear out the elderly China thus avoided the fate of the Soviet Union in 1980s, where leadership ranks resembled a slowly decaying geriatric ward Political purge, once so fierce, grew rarer and milder The rest of the Chinese bureaucracy swung back toward institutionalized governance as well No longer were the rules of the game supposed to shift with each new leader Legal reform becomes a hallmark of the post Mao era.Socially, China gradually opened up Authorities backed away from the pervasive ideology that had characterized the Maoist era Chinese authorities themselves began to experiment with yet deeper reform Controls over the media were relaxed And in 1987, under reformed minded CCP general secretary Zhoa Ziyang, they edged tentatively toward separating the Party from the organs of government the further steps toward meaningful political reform that Chian has seen to date Constrained ReformAfter 1989 Tiananmen June Fourth Incident.in 1997, Rule according to law become a core CCP slogan, enshrined in the constitution two years later The Story of Qiu Ju 1992 in 2003, Andrew Nathan noted in 2003, Chinese leaders had seemingly managed to institutionalize single party political rule, fusing it with market capitalism, and global trade network to create resilient authoritarian regime that would carry forward into the twenty first century Reform StagnantThe Sun Zhigang incident refers to the 2003 death of the migrant worker Sun Zhigang in Guangzhou, as a result of physical abuse Eastern European and Central Asian countries where Colour revolution happened to topple authoritarian regimes during the early 2000s, Beijing steadily escalate crackdown, remand judges supremacy of CCP rule over constitution and laws.The Great Firewall of China GFW Internet censorship in China is to block access to selected foreign websites and to slow down cross border internet traffic 1 The effect includes limiting access or blocking access to foreign information sources, such as Google search, Facebook, Twitter, WikipediaChinese politics resemble a feudal oligarchy TOP CCP figures controlled massive networks of personal influence of composed of loyal followers spread throughout middle and low level posts The fusion of money and power that had taken place since 199os meant these network sprawled across Party organs, SOE state owned enterprises , and private financial institution Such cliques defied the basic Leninist principle of centralized rule in a one party state, Reform unwind 2012 2007 political purge under a campaign against graft , centralized his power, Ascend to Papa Xi,Such moves run contrary to internal CCP practices dating from the 1980s Under those old customs, top Party officials had divided power among themselves, seeking elite stability through a rough balance of power Xu has overturned this, stamping himself as the ost powerful Chinese leaders in decades The 2017 19th Party Congress confirmed this enshrining Xi Jinping Thought in the ideological pantheon of the Chinese Communist Party, vaulting him well above Jiang or Hu in important, and approaching that of Mao p30 1949 7 3 2012 9 2013 10 251958 11 15 Horus L Kai 2015 12 11 1942 12 3 Zhou Young Kong security czar, his actual turf in state energy sector, in Sichuan provincial administration 2013 12 1 2015 6 11 2016 6 1968 7 2 ,28 Ling Jihua , December 2014 under investigation, was sentenced to life imprisonment in July 2016 1943 6 2015 3 15 2014 6 30 18 14 2015 anti corruption, military Commission vice chairman The counter reform erap34 Chinese with the most to lose are diversifying again risk place their money in Vancouver real estate and their children in U.S college, and seeking passport from one or another of the small Caribbean nations that offer citizenship for sale Chapter 2 Society and Economy The closing of the Chinese DreamChinese Dream Success through Imperial exams meritocracy gaokao national college entrance examine established 1952 abolished in 1966 return in 19771978 colleges admitted only 273,000 over 6 million applicants 4.7% Today, these early graduates disproportionally occupy the pinnacles of influence of China In those early reform years, simply getting any state educational certification offered the promise of changing one s life for better.That promise is now fraying higher education facilitating social mobility is fading because1 dramatic devaluation in the worth of a college degree.2 spreading socioeconomic inequalities to exclude poor, rural and migrant children from education.National wide universities 1989 2012, rural students from 47% 57% , However, Beijing University, 1980s, 30% of students from countryside 2010, only 10% where China registered rural residents is 2 3 of the total population Reasons 1 Declined government funding, drop from 84% 1991 to 62% 2004 Schools increasingly resorted to tuition and miscellaneous fee to cover the difference Data in 2003 reveal that Beijing metropolitan area received any form of college education in 64.9%, only 14.6% of rural counterparts.2 hukou born in 1950s as a tough system of population control and resource allocation Urban peasants are bound to the land, whereas, urban worker and cadres were eligible for food rations, subsidized housing, old age pension, other public services denied to rural counterparts Tough barriers limited the ability of citizens to change their hukou registration success at gaokao being one crucial exception and make status hereditary parents passed on their own identification to their children.Children of rural migrants generally excluded local public services, such as schools 1 of 5 children left behind in rural areas as their parent s go for cities to work.hukou system lead to entranced preference favor registered urban residents of large cities Beijing University, in 2004, 308 spots reserved for Beijing residents 1,748 enrollment in 80,000 Beijing applicants, 94 for Jiangsu province 400,000 applicants , so a Beijing students to be admitted 30 times greater than one from Jiangsu Nearly a decade later, wide to 408 73,000 vs 57 450,000 Proletariat and bourgeoisie are not the abstract class label, they are effectively stamped onto each individual s hukou registration And in a reversal of Marxist logic, Communist authorities now stand on the side of the latter discriminating against farmers and workers for the sake of middle class urbanities p443 from 1978 to 1998, gaokao pass rate rise from 25% to 34% A rare commodity end in 1990s.Between 1998 and 2000, college students double from 1 to 2 million In 2016, 7 million.Huge spending on education leads to graftAlso linked financial and career incentives to published articles, patents lead to decline of quality of high education.Initially model along German lines, with many vocational schools and few universities program in 2015, College acceptance rate is 74.3% earlier wave of Chinese graduate student studying abroad from 1980 199os, depend on merit scholarship Now, new wave students pay full tuition In UW, 1 of 7 of 2015 is international students Gaokao viewed as the few relatively egalitarian channel for upward social mobility the modern incarnation of the imperial Chines Dream In US, American universities in nineteen century expensive finishing schools for children of the wealthy to socialize and find mates chapter 3 Politics Internal Decay and Social Unrest 1980s were the heyday of legal reform But over the past three decades, efforts to deepen reforms have bumped into against Beijing s absolute prohibition on challenging one Party rule Now, China Technocratic rule has given way to crony capitalism, political rotNow, China is kleptocracy Responsive authoritarianism is devolving into the politics of street protest and state repression, social radicalization China s state effectiveness to black box political struggles Centralization of power in Xi s hands1 nebulous small groups chaired personally by Xi, marginalized, e.g the role of the premier Li, Keqiang 2 tacit norms exempting current or former Politburo Standing committee members from prosecution, Security Czardisciplinary apparatus Disciplinary inspection commissions DICs , centralized in Xi s ally Wang Qishan , instead of rectification of political errors in the past to anti graph work, even beyond purge 2013 2014, 54 cadres perished from unnatural causes yifzhiguo yigui zhidang use law to govern the country, use internal regulations to govern the Party And look toward the Party center i.e., Xi himself 2016 1 29 Erode Hong Kong s autonomy, highly effective bureaucracy, capable technocratic managers, an authoritarian executive branch with responsive channels of governance, firm rules of law, an independent anti corruption commission 3 Personality cult Deng Xiaping set the tone in 1978 We must strengthen our legal system so as to make sure that institutions and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes, or whenever the leaders change their views Very often, what leaders say is taken as the law, and whoever disagrees is called a law breaker That kind of law changes whenever a leader s views change So we must concentrate on enacting criminal and civil codes, procedural laws, and other necessary laws Chap 4 Religion and Ideology Falun GongProtest in Beijing 4 24 1999, July 1999, brutal repressionLi Hongzhi immigrate to New York in 1996Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party in 2004, an explicit reference to the Chinese Communist Party s own letter issued at the height of the 1963 1964 Sino Soviet split, Criticizing Moscow s revisionist ideological line as anti universe force that has pushed civilization to the brink of destruction, and will eventually be destroyed.The Epoch Times , in 2000New Tang Dynasty Television NTD, Chinese Launched in 2001 Shen Yun Performing Arts found in 2006http www.minghui.org practices from Maoist era, public confession Charles Bi chuen Xue Chinese better known by his screen name Xue Manzi Peter Dahlin Peter HumphreyZhang Kai Gui Minhai book publisherWang Xiaolu Chinese reporter makes on air confession for reporting market chaos Religion repression lead to radicalization Red Turbans 1351 1368 White Lotus Society 1796 1804 Taiping 1850 1864 Christian movement Boxer 1898 1900 anti Christian nativism Eastern Lightning , aka The Church of Almighty God, Zhaoyuan McDonald s Cult Murder.State repression and the delaying legitimacy of official religious institutions are pushing the most evangelical of religious groups underground, where they nix with a whole range of those at society s edges migrants, petitioners, the rural poor THey become politicized and radicalized China1 Since 1989, Beijing has firmly adhered to one core principle Authoritarian one Party policy, CCP Chinese Communist Party 2 Zhiyong s closing statement on January 22, 2014, at the end of his trial.When hopes of reform are dashed, people will rise up and seek revolution The privileged and powerful have long transferred their children and wealth overseas they couldn t care less of the misfortune and suffering of the disempowered, nor do they care about China s future 3 Tianducheng , aka Sky City, is a housing estate in the suburbs of Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China Construction began around 2007 Its central feature is 108 metre tall 354 foot replica of the Eiffel Tower and 31 km2 12 sq mi of Parisian Cadre evaluation systemPolitical hack a pejorative term describing a person who is part of the political party apparatus , but whose intentions arealigned with victory than personal conviction The term hired gun is often used in tandem to further describe the moral bankruptcy of the hack placing out a brick, and receiving jade of high value in return Linking up with the outside worldRed capitalism turn communist orthodoxy in its head, redefine Party tenets to accept self made billionaires into the CCP itself Diaosi a young male of mediocre appearance and social standing Born into a humble family, he has no car, no house, and no connections xuequfang class struggle chengguan political legal apparatus security apparatus, disciplinary apparatusxinfang shangfang The words most commonly translated as petition are xinfang , literally letters and visits, or shangfang appellate system in general and capital appeals jingkong appellants diaomin unruly people litigation trickers songshi that is, human right activists weiwen stability maintenance zhengnengliang positive energyYipiao foujue make a gin stir, get a big result make a small stir, get a small result, stay quiet and nothing happens.River Elegy 1988 Wang Luxiang Teng Biao born 2 August 1973 human rights activist Xu Zhiyong March 2, 1973 human rights activist Li Chengpeng is a prominent writer and social critic Chen Guangcheng is a Chinese civil rights activist Barefoot lawyer self taught Guo Feixiong is the pen name of Yang Maodong Minxin Pei Bob Fu is a Chinese American pastor.Wang Xiaoning he was sentenced to ten years in 2003, released in 2012 prison Shi Tao Shi Tao is a Chinese journalist, writer , poet, who in 2005 was sentenced to 10 years in prison for releasing a document of the Communist Party to an overseas Chinese democracy site Jiang Lijun, a Chinese freelance writer Yang Jia 2008, murdering six Shanghai police officers with a knife The Deng Yujiao incident 2009 Xia Junfeng stabbed 2 chengguan 2009 Lei Yang was a Chinese environmentalist who died following an altercation with police in Changping District, Beijing Lei was detained on suspicion of soliciting prostitution at a foot parlor He was 29 when he died 2016 Wukan protests 20112015 2016 disappear of 5 Hong Kong booksellers.Jiang Zemin toppling of Chen Xitong in 1995Hu Jintao s removal of Chen Liangyu in 2006 seed law case 2003 2001 Excellent overview of China s problems An excellent overview of the problems facing the Chinese leadership, concentrating on the retreat from the economic and political reforms of the 1990s and 2000s and highlighting the possible risks and consequences stemming from this Recommended reading for anyone interested in today s China. Courageous and correct. The history of China, the economy and culture Really engaging and informative. Good look at China s social and political institutions, and how their lack of development frustrates stability. Fascinating insight into the news out of china China s reform era is ending Core factors that characterized it political stability, ideological openness, and rapid economic growth are unraveling Since the s, Beijing s leaders have firmly rejected any fundamental reform of their authoritarian one party political system, and on the surface, their efforts have been a success But as Carl Minzner shows, a closer look at China s reform era reveals a different truth Over the past three decades, a frozen political system has fueled both the rise of entrenched interests within the Communist Party itself, and the systematic underdevelopment of institutions of governance among state and society at large Economic cleavages have widened Social unrest has worsened Ideological polarization has deepened Now, to address these looming problems, China s leaders are progressively cannibalizing institutional norms and practices that have formed the bedrock of the regime s stability in the reform era End of an Era explains how China arrived at this dangerous turning point, and outlines the potential outcomes that could result History doesn t repeat itself, but it often rhymes pretty much summarizes Minzner s thesis in a nutshell The Reform Era that Deng Xiaoping ushered in has finally come to a close It has entered a new one defined by Xi Jinping and the CCP taking a sledgehammer to the limited political openness, political institutionalization, and norms that defined that era Minzner vividly illustrates how, as China s economic and demographic challenges started to metastasize, Xi and the CCP have increasingl History doesn t repeat itself, but it often rhymes pretty much summarizes Minzner s thesis in a nutshell The Reform Era that Deng Xiaoping ushered in has finally come to a close It has entered a new one defined by Xi Jinping and the CCP taking a sledgehammer to the limited political openness, political institutionalization, and norms that defined that era Minzner vividly illustrates how, as China s economic and demographic challenges started to metastasize, Xi and the CCP have increasingly centralized power in the hands of the Party and Xi himself He also shows how the Party has turned to a watered down version of ethnonationalism and political control and repression to maintain its grip Minzner s most interesting point is how the CCP has struggled, like imperial Chinese dynasties of the past, to deal with citizen discontent stemming from the lack of legitimate legal channels for dispute settlement between aggrieved citizens and their government This is essentially the crux of the problem facing China Given how few legitimate channels Chinese citizens have to seek political change, and given how there aren t any trusted and established political institutions outside the CCP, the future for China, given its current trajectory, doesn t look that much different than the USSR or, in Minzner s opinion, Tsarist Russia before it fell In other words, an increasingly sclerotic regime incapable of meeting the economic and political needs of its people Skeptical I was too Yet consider China s declining economic outlook relative to its overwhelmingly strong performance of the past three decades and the social challenges that come with a declining number of working age adults combined with an expected explosion of retirees Throw an increasingly large national debt into the mix, the perception that the Party is no longer living up to its promise of economic prosperity, and an unexpected crisis that doesn t bode well for the CCP The end result the foundations of the CCP s power start to erode and China slowly slides into yet another era of upheaval in line with its history of dynastic cycles And a final note This book, while primarily about China, is an important case study that helps elucidate the ideas and arguments found in books about the decline of political institutions and political order, such as Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson and How Democracies Die by Steven levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt

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